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NOTES
SALES - PER AVERSIONEM - BUYERS' PRIOR
VIEWING OF PROPERTY
Plaintiff agreed to buy from defendant for a lump sum an
unimproved lot, described in the contract to sell as "Lot 300,
Sq. 14, Sable corner Norton, St. Bernard Parish, on grounds
measuring about 80 x 106, or as per title." Plaintiff had viewed
the property before signing the agreement, but there was no
physical evidence of its boundaries. After signing the agree-
ment, plaintiff discovered from a survey plat that the lot's
actual depth on one side was 16 feet less than described in the
agreement. As this shortage resulted in a deficiency of more
than one-twentieth of the area stated in the agreement, plain-
tiff sued for diminution of the purchase price under Civil Code
Article 2494.1 Defendant contended that Civil Code Article
2495 precluded diminution; the proposed sale was by boundaries
(per aversionem) because plaintiff had viewed the property
prior to signing the agreement. The trial court rendered judg-
ment for plaintiff, and the court of appeal affirmed. Held, a
buyer's viewing of property with no visible physical boundaries
does not render the sale per aversionem. The measurements of
the property appearing in the purchase agreement were con-
trolling and diminution of the purchase price was an appropriate
remedy for the buyer. 2 Scurria v. Russo, 134 So. 2d 679 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1961).
Litigation with reference to disparity between the quantity
agreed upon and that actually delivered in sales of immovable
property arises in three factual situations contemplated by the
Louisiana Civil Code.8 Classification of the sale in question
1. Plaintiff's alternative demand was for return of his deposit with a like
amount as penalty for failure of defendant to perform, which penalty was stipu-
lated in the contract.
2. Upon refusal of plaintiff to perform under the agreement, defendant sold
the property to another. Since the property could not be tendered to plaintiff
with a diminution in price, a return of the deposit with a penalty was ordered.
On rehearing, the judgment was reversed insofar as it allowed attorney's fees to
plaintiff.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2492, 2943 (sales by rate per measure with extent of
premises indicated), 2494 (sales for a lump sum, extent of premises indicated),
2495 (sales by boundary for a lump sum) (1870).
The articles of the French Civil Code, to which the Louisiana provisions gen-
erally correspond, are lucidly discussed in 11 BEUDANT, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL
[468]
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determines whether either party is entitled to an increase or
diminution of price. Civil Code Articles 2492 and 2493 deal
with sales at a rate per measure in which the extent of the
premises is indicated.4  If the quantity is less than indicated,
the buyer may demand delivery of the quantity indicated, and
if the seller cannot perform, the buyer is entitled to a diminu-
tion proportionate to the price agreed upon.5 However, should
the premises contain more acreage than specified and the over-
age exceed one-twentieth of the quantity specified, the buyer
has the option to pay a proportionate supplement of the price
or recede from the contract.6 Although never discussed in the
jurisprudence, it would appear that if the overage does not ex-
ceed one-twentieth of the quantity specified, the seller should
FRAzNAIS 133, § 179 (1938) [hereinafter cited as BEUDANT] : "However, an abso-
lute exactness is not always required, especially when immovables are involved.
Concerning this, four cases should be distinguished :
"(1) An immovable is sold, whatever it amounts to, for a fixed price. The
immovable has been sold without regard to its area; it is not necessary to take
account of any difference. [LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2495 (1870)]
"(2) An immovable is sold at so much per acre, without indicating either
the area or the total price. The price will result from the measuring and no
difficulty is possible; the area will be disclosed by the measuring and the price
determined thereby. [LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2492 (1870)]
"(3) An immovable is sold, at the rate of so much per measure, by indicating
in advance the area and the price. A tract of 50 acres is sold for a hundred
thousand francs, at the rate of two thousand francs per acre. The hundred thou-
sand francs representing the fifty acres, the latter should be delivered. Any
shortage or excess, however inconsiderable it may be, gives rise to a diminution
or an augmentation proportional to the price. Also, if the real acreage is greater
than that stated in the contract, the buyer may resist the sale if the excess is
equal to a twentieth of the declared acreage [LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2492, 2493
(1870)]. If, however, the clause 'without guaranty of the area' is included the
buyer must take delivery without a modification of the price.
"(4) A particular immovable is sold and the area and a total price are fixed
by the contract. A certain domain, having an area of 50 acres, for a hundred
thousand francs; the measure is not given here as an element for fixing the price
but as a means of verification. Consequently an absolute exactness is not re-
quired because a total sum has been specified without fixing the rate per measure
and the parties must evidently attach less importance to the exact measure than
to the whole. The difference in area gives rise to a proportional supplement or
diminution in the price, but only if it is equal to a 20th at least. [LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2494 (1870)1." (As translated in SMITH, LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE
MATERIALS ON SALES AND LEASES 148 (1954).)
4. There is a fourth situation which is not specifically dealt with in the Lou-
isiana Civil Code. In sales where there is a price at so much per measure, but
there is mention of neither quantity nor total price, the price is merely determined
by subsequent measuring. See BEUDANT § 137(2). See also Carbajal v. Tessier,
163 La. 894, 113 So. 138 (1927).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2492 (1870); Carbajal v. Tessier, 163 La. 894, 113
So. 138 (1927) (art. 2492 applied). Even if the buyer does not require delivery
of the amount agreed upon, he may nevertheless demand diminution of the price.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2492 (1870).
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2493 (1870) ; Phelps v. Wilson, 16 La. 185 (1840)
(art. 2494 applied).
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still be entitled to a supplement of the price, but the buyer pre-
cluded in the alternative from receding from the contract .
7
.
Civil Code Article 2494 contemplates the sale of property
withan indication of the extent of the premises but for a lump
sum rather than at a rate per measure. Any discrepancy be-
tween actual and indicated area gives rise to a proportionate
increase" or diminution of price only if the real measure varies
,by one-twentieth from that mentioned in the agreement. 9
Article 2495 covers the sale, for a lump price, of property
;"designated by adjoining tenements, and sold from boundary
to boundary" - called a sale per aversionem. Disparity may
arise if the sale contains mention of the areal extent of the
premises.10 In this situation, there can be neither increase nor
diminution of the purchase price." The rationale of the rule is
that'.since the parties described the property by boundaries they
must have attached importance to the property itself rather
,than to its actual measure ;12 consequently, the boundaries,
7. This is not perfectly clear from the wording of the article, but it is the
way the French treat the situation (BEUDANT § 137(3) ), and it seems the logical
construction of Article 2493. Thus, it is submitted the article should be inter-
preted as if it read: "If the quantity is more than specified, the buyer must sup-
plement the price; but if the overage is more than one-twentieth, the buyer may
either give the supplement or recede from the contract." An analogous problem
is encountered in connection with LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2494 (1870). See note
8 infra.
8. Article 2494 does not seem to provide for an increase to the seller, but only
,for a diminution to the buyer. However, the court in Phelps v. Wilson, 16 La.
185 (1840), said in dictum that such an increase would be allowed, and this
seems just. Construing Article 2496 in conjunction with Article 2494 achieves
the same result. There is, however, some question of the validity of this con-
struction. The French counterpart of Article 2496 immediately follows the French
,counterpart of Article 2494. In drafting the Louisiana Civil Code, the redactors
inserted Article 2495, which does not appear in the French Code, between Ar-
ticles 2494 and 2496. The language of Article 2496, "in cases where there is room
for an augmentation of price for the surplus," implies that the article should be
construed in conjunction with Article 2494 if the original intent evidenced in the
French Code is to be preserved in Louisiana law. This construction, that the
intent and the symmetry of the articles are not disturbed by the insertion of
Article 2495, has not been discussed in any Louisiana jurisprudence.
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2494 (1870). See Pike v. Kentwood Bank, 146 La.
704, 83 So. 904 (1919) ; Gladstone Realty v. Currie, 126 La. 115, 52 So. 237
(1910) ; Fortin v. Blount, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 179 (La. 1823). The parties may stip-
ulate to the contrary, however, under Article 2494.
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2495 (1870) ; Campbell v. Cook, 151 La. 267, 91 So.
731 (1922) (Art, 2495 applied) ; Johnston v. Quarles, 3 La. 90 (1831) (Art.
2495 applied). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 854 (1870) ; Marginy v. Nivet, 2 La.
498 (1831) (Art. 854 applied).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2495 (1870). See also Wurzburger v. Meric, 20 La.
Ann. 415 (1868) ; Kirkpatrick v. McMillen, 14 La. 497 (1840).
12. Hunley v. Ascani, 174 La. 712, 141 So. 385 (1932) ; Phelps v. Wilson, 16
La. 185 (1840) ; Cuny v. Archinard, 5 Mart.(N.S.) 238 (La. 1826) ; Wiltz v.
Home Building and Loan, 24 So. 2d 204 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) ; Sharpless v.
rather ,than the measure, describe the object that is the pur-
chaser's cause.1 3 In accord with this rationale, if there exists
an error as to the defined object, an adjustment of the price
may be allowed on the basis of error.1 4 If one of the parties is
in bad' faith - if the seller knows the indicated measure is less,
or the buyer more, than it is in fact- it would seem adjust-
'ment of the purchase price accordingly would be justified.
15
The Code apparently limits the applicability of Article 2495
to a definite set of facts, i.e., immovable property designated
'by adjoining tenements and sold from boundary to boundary,
with a price fixed at a lump sum. However, the jurisprudence
has not observed the rigidity demanded by Article 2495 when
the buyer has viewed the property before buying. By using
this "prior viewing" factor, sales which should be governed by
Article 2494 have been treated as sales per aversionem under
Article 2495. The following factual situations have been found
sufficient, if there was a lump sum price, to "convert" the sale
to one per aversionem subject to Article 2495; when a tract was
described as having one and one-half arpents between described
lateral boundaries, but the sale took place on the premises with
physical boundaries evident to the buyer:6 when the descrip-
tion read "the double cottage Nos. 1728-1730, Seventh Street
between Carondelet and Baronne, the ground measuring ap-
proximately 30' x 120' or as per title,"'17 the court holding that
since the buyer had seen the property the words "or as per
title" meant he would receive everything he saw and wanted to
which the seller had title ;18 when the buyer had been on the
premises and seen that the property was enclosed all around,
Adkins, 22 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
13. See generally Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REv. 2
(1951).
14. This situation arises when the parties are agreed upon the boundaries used
to describe the premises purchased, but the seller does not own all the land be-
tween the boundaries. The purchaser is then allowed a diminution of the price
proportionate to the shortage. Guglielmi v. Geismar, 47 La. Ann. 147, 16 So.
742 (1895), detailed facts given in previous appeal, 46 La. Ann. 280, 14 So. 50
(1894) ; Campbell v. Cook, 151 La. 267, 91 So. 731 (1922) (dictum). Although
no cases were found in point, it seems relief on the basis of error should also be
allowed when there is mistake concerning the boundaries themselves-one party
relying on one physical boundary, and the other on another. The provisions on
error are contained in LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1820-1846 (1870).
15. It has been so held as to a seller in bad faith. Lesassier v. Dashiell, 13
La. 151 (1839).
16. Ragan v. Gwinn, 19 La. Ann. 133 (1867).
17.-Hunley v. Ascani, 174 La. 712, 714, 141 So. 385, 385 (1932)..18. 174 La. 712, 141 So. 385 (1932).
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although the description contained only the linear measure-
ments of the property. 19
On the other hand, in almost identical factual situations,
the courts have refused to consider the sale as one per aver-
sionem merely because the buyer viewed the property prior to
the sale. However, the general tenor of the decisions seems
more a rejection of allowing the "prior viewing" factor to in-
fluence classification of the particular sale than a strict ad-
herence to the requirements of Article 2495. For example,
Favrot & Livaudais v. Stauffer"0 involved a sale for a lump sum
price of property described as "situated on Carondelet and Per-
dido Streets, measuring about 30 feet by 100 feet in the square
bounded by Poydras and Baronne Streets."'2 1 Although the
buyer had viewed the premises, the sale was held not to be
per aversionem. The recited measurements controlled because
the buyer had made known his intent to reconstruct a building
located on the lot, his plans being based on the recited measure-
ments. In Fitzgerald v. Hyland,22 the buyer, after viewing the
property, made an offer to purchase based upon the dimensions
given him by the seller's agent. The offer described the prop-
erty as being situated in square 48, fronting on Jefferson High-
way "running thru square the grounds measuring approximately
120 x 205 or, as per title," 23 with the price recited in lump sum.
The buyer had seen that the rear boundary of the property was
a street, but in classifying the sale as per aversionem, the court
said the controlling factor was the phrase in the description,
"running thru square. ' 24
The court in the instant case, although holding the "prior
viewing" factor not controlling on the particular facts involved,
implied that had the buyer seen visible physical markings or
boundaries, the visual inspection would have outweighed the
significance of the recited measurements in classification of the
sale. 25 Thus, the effect of the prior viewing factor in classifying
19. Wurzburger v. Meric, 20 La. Ann. 415 (1868).
20. 112 La. 158, 36 So. 307 (1904). See also Kirkpatrick v. McMillen, 14
La. 497 (1840).
21. 112 La. 158, 161, 36 So. 307, 308.
22. 199 La. 381, 6 So. 2d 321 (1942).
23. Id. at 385, 6 So. 2d at 322.
24. It should be noted that the effect of the Fitzgerald holding is to permit
a sale to be per wversionem as to depth although not as to width.
25. "When a purchaser can look at the boundaries of the property and his
decision to buy is made as a result of seeing those boundaries and knowing just
what piece of property he is buying, the sale is made to be per aversionem. ...
[Vol. XXlIII
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sales of immovable property was apparently made to depend
upon what the viewer saw or could have seen; a prior viewing
did not automatically convert the sale to one per aversionem.
According to the instant case, there must be visible markers
of some sort to indicate the location of the boundaries before
it can be inferred that the buyer intended to buy the property
per aversionem with negligible regard for its areal extent. Ar-
ticle 2495 sets forth a mechanical test, dependent upon easily
ascertainable factors, for determining whether a sale is per
aversionem. Injection of the question whether the buyer viewed
the property in order to classify the sale injects his actual intent
and displaces the rigid requirements of the Code. However, if
the use of this consideration is to continue, limiting the effect
of the buyer's viewing to what he saw or should have seen should
at least limit the degree of variance from the exacting require-
ments for a sale per aversionem contained in the Civil Code.
Allen L. Smith, Jr.
TORTS--NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED MENTAL ANGUISH OCCASIONED
BY INJURY TO ANOTHER
Plaintiffs sought damages for mental anguish suffered when
their child became violently ill from having eaten rat poison
placed in their home by defendant exterminator; they alleged
that they could not secure a reliable antidote because the ex-
terminator was unable to identify the poison's ingredients. The
district court dismissed on exception of no cause of action. The
court of appeal reversed and remanded.' Held, although gen-
erally one may not recover for mental anguish resulting from
injury to another, plaintiffs stated a cause of action in this
case since the exterminator owed a duty directly to them, in-
dependently of any duty owed their child, to be able to inform
them within a reasonable time of the ingredients of the poison
used in their home. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.,
135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
However, when he cannot see, by buildings, or fences, or other marks or monu-
ments just what the boundaries of the property are, it may be said that he is
influenced by-the surface area or by the measurements .... " 134 So. 2d at 682.
1. The father also sued for the child's benefit for injuries allegedly sustained
from eating the poison. The jury, however, ruled for defendants, and that claim
was not appealed.
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